This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Part II of this article maps the battleground by providing an overview of the smartphone and tablet industry, Apple and Android market positioning, and the patent portfolios at play. Part III offfers an overview of the ongoing litigations between the parties, focusing on the procedural history and substantive claims in the U.S. litigation. Part IV compares and contrasts the key procedural aspects of international arbitration and litigation particularly as applied to patent disputes and considers these distinctions in the context of the AppleSamsung litigation.
As elaborated in Part IV, international arbitration of complex patent disputes offfers parties several benefĳits over litigation including, but not limited to, party autonomy, cost and time efffĳiciencies, multi-national coordination, and foreign recognition of awards. In the alternate universe of international arbitration, patent disputes, such as the Apple-Samsung litigation, would be resolved efffectively and more efffĳiciently. The substantive outcome would be better reasoned, globally comprehensive, delivered expeditiously and provide more certainty as to fĳinality and enforcement. In the alternate universe, the time and cost savings would be invested into new technology research and development which would better serve the parties, industry and consumers.
II Case Study: The Android Battleground-Apple OS and Android
A survey of current patent litigations discloses a growing dichotomy between the technological giants: on one side is typically Apple or Microsoft and on the other side is a manufacturer using Google's Android operating system−namely HTC, Motorola or Samsung. It is a dichotomy resulting from the development of competing computer operating systems, the convergence of consumer electronic devices using those systems and the adoption of one system or the other by device manufacturers. Each of the players in the marketplace, be they traditionally software companies like Microsoft, Internet-focused companies like Google, consumer device companies like Samsung or computer system companies like Apple, now vie for positioning against one another in the growing global smartphone and tablet marketplace. The patent competition between these companies forms the foundation of the Android wars. The operating systems of Apple ("iOS") and Google ("Android") currently account for ninety percent of the global market share of the smartphone and tablet industry.4 As commentators note, over the past fĳive years there has been This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV While a longstanding concept,12 the tablet PC or media tablet has gained considerable popularity in the global marketplace over the past 4 years, partly due to convergence with smartphone technology. This slate-shaped device is similar in size and function to a laptop with numerous enhanced features such as a touch screen and improved personalized settings. Through the last quarter of 2012, the Apple iPad Mini and the Google Nexus 7, accounted for a large portion of the worldwide sale of about 150 million tablets. 13 The recent introduction of the latest Microsoft tablets running the Windows OS has taken substantial market share as well.14 Analysts anticipate that tablet purchases by businesses will reach 13 million units this year, more than tripling by 2016 to reach 53 million units. 15 The growth of the smartphone and tabloid markets, short product life cycles and technical and marketing-based consumer lock-ins promise signifĳicant ongoing revenue opportunities.
B
Mobile Operating Systems: Apple iOS v. Google Android As noted, the operating systems of Apple and Google are by far the most prominent.16 However, iOS is compatible only with Apple products such as the iPhone and iPad17 whereas the Google Android system is bundled with the products of numerous mobile device manufacturers ranging from Samsung to Lenovo and Amazon. For example, reportedly, at least 30 million iPads have 12 In This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV been sold in the U.S., compared to only 1.4 million Samsung Android tablets through June 2012.18 Considering the full list of Android suppliers, by the end of 2012, the Android operating system was utilized by 57.9% of all global mobile devices.19 Apple's iOS came in second with 14.9 percent share.20 Industry analysts including both Gartner and the International Data Center ("IDC") anticipate that the Android OS will continue to lead the market at least through 2016.21 Apart from being a competitor, historically Samsung has been one of Apple's largest suppliers. In fact, Samsung provides some of the iPhone's most important components: the flash memory that holds the phone's apps, music and operating software; the working memory, or DRAM; and the applications processor.22 Together these account for 26% of the component cost of an iPhone. 23 What this market data reveals is that in as much as the Apple-Samsung litigation is a battle to control the mobile device marketplace, it is a proxy battle between Apple and Google for mobile operating system dominance.24 Quite possibly, the Apple-Samsung litigation is only the fĳirst skirmish and there is a much larger legal battle between Apple and Google to come.25 18 Evans, supra note 6. This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV C IP Arsenal: Patent Portfolios as Shields and Swords The bundles of patents registered to Apple, Google, Microsoft and Samsung26 serve as an IP arsenal for deterring competitors, extracting revenue and concessions by means of licensing agreements, and waging war through fĳiling patent infringement claims against companies that refuse to comply. From 2010 to 2011, smartphone companies spent roughly $20 billion on patent litigation and patent purchases.27 In a widely circulated article and in other public comments, Judge Richard Posner of the 7th Circuit has argued there are marked defĳiciencies in U.S. patent laws and ongoing patent litigations are a threat to innovation.28
In 2011, for the fĳirst time, both Apple and Google spent more on patent lawsuits and building patent portfolios than on research and development of new products.29 This remarkable and rather frightening trend raises the question whether litigation is the best means of dispute resolution for these technical giants and the technology industry as a whole. Where disputes cannot be resolved through negotiation, perhaps there is a more efffĳicient and economical solution that a better reasoned and globally comprehensive decision without diverting resources from innovation.
III

Apple v. Samsung Litigation
Apple and Samsung litigations are playing out in courts around the world. , and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (collectively "Samsung"), a South Korean electronics company, the largest provider by volume of mobile devices in the U.S. and the second largest in the world.31 Apple claimed that instead of using its own research and development resources, Samsung had chosen to "slavishly copy" Apple's "innovative technology, distinctive user interfaces, and elegant and distinctive product and packaging design."32 Apple maintained that if Samsung was not enjoined, Samsung's products would continue to "erode the distinctiveness" of Apple's design, take market share, and cause irreparable harm to its brand.33
In its complaint, amended multiple times,34 Apple alleged that Samsung's Galaxy cell phones and computer tablets infringed several Apple designs, user interfaces (UI) and utility patents. With regards to design, Apple claimed that the iPhone's distinctive front face was instantly recognizable as "Apple" and "iPhone."35 Using several graphics, Apple attempted to illustrate that Samsung's Galaxy S 4G and Infuse 4G appear to the ordinary observer to be "substantially the same."36 Additionally, Apple claimed that the overall appearance of the Galaxy Tab 10.1 evidences copying in that every major element of Apple's pat- • a flat, clear, black-colored, rectangular front surface with four evenly rounded corners;
• an inset rectangular display screen centered on the front surface that leaves very narrow borders on either side of the display screen and substantial borders above and below the display screen; and
• a rounded, horizontal speaker slot centered on the front surface above the display screen,
• where the rectangular front surface is otherwise substantially free of ornamentation outside of an optional button area centrally located below the display.").
38
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Id. On May 14, 2012, the Federal Circuit afffĳirmed the District Court's ruling on the lack of irreparable harm with respect to Apple's smartphone design patent but reversed the District Court's conclusion that the tablet design patent was 43 For the D087 patent, involving the front face design of the iPhone, the court maintained that substantial questions had been raised about its validity due to substantial similarity to prior art. For the D889 patent, involving tablet design, the court Samsung had raised a substantial question about whether the patented design would have been obvious in light of a combination of several prior art references. On June 26, 2012, the District Court continued with its analysis of the injunction factors to fĳind that the balance of hardships tipped in Apple's favor and it was in the public interest of protecting patent rights to grant the injunction.50 Based thereon, the District Court granted the preliminary injunction which barred Samsung from making, using, offfering to sell, or selling within the United States, or importing into the United States Samsung's Galaxy S 4G until there was a fĳinal ruling on the merits of the case.51 In accordance with applicable U.S. federal civil procedure,52 the Court ordered Apple to provide a $95.6 million bond in the event that the injunction was found erroneous in future proceedings.53 The injunction on the Galaxy Nexus was vacated after trial where it was found not to infringe.54
ii Pre-Trial Discovery Apple and Samsung engaged in extensive pre-trial disclosures and motion practice, generating massive quantities of documents and other evidence, in various litigations. U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) allows for pretrial discovery regarding any non-privileged matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. This discovery is not limited to evidence admissible at the trial; rather, it extends to any information that appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
In the U.S. Apple-Samsung litigation, the parties exchanged document requests and written interrogatories and examined party and non-party witnesses in depositions conducted worldwide.55 While the full extent of 48 Id.
49
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51
The It is likely that all of these witnesses and many more were deposed in advance of trial. Over one hundred attorneys from twelve diffferent law fĳirms appeared in the U.S. litigation.58 Undoubtedly many more attorneys in those and other fĳirms worked on the case without making an appearance. Presumably discovery constituted the bulk of the billings in the case.
iii
Trial and Post-Trial Proceedings In July 2012, nine jurors were chosen from a pool of seventy-four candidates. The jury reportedly included a social worker, a systems engineer, a mechanical engineer, a city worker, an AT&T supervisor, a store operations manager for a cycling retailer, a benefĳits and payroll manager for startups, and an unemployed video gamer.59 Only one member of the jury had any experience with patents.60
The trial lasted three-weeks.61 After presentation of evidence by the parties, the Court supplied the jury with over 100 pages of instructions62 and a 20-page This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV verdict form.63 Questions were raised afterwards as to whether the jury even bothered to read all of the instructions. After two and a half days of deliberations, the jury found largely in favor of Apple and awarded $1.049 billion in damages against Samsung.64 According to the verdict, the Android system as integrated into over twenty Samsung smartphone products infringed the technology, trade dress, and UI of Apple's iPhone products.65 Samsung was found guilty of infringement for the pinchand-zoom, tap-and-zoom, and bounce-back technologies, as well as the UI iconography of the iPhone's front screen.66 All Samsung's claims against Apple were rejected.67
Although the jury found that Samsung's infringement was willful,68 the trial court later rejected this fĳinding.69 In denying Samsung's motion to overturn the entire verdict, Judge Koh held that the trial was not manifestly unfair and that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's fĳindings on infringement.70
The Judge also rejected Apple's motion to permanently enjoin all sales of Samsung products violating the patents holding that Apple failed to show a "causal nexus" between Samsung's infringement and any lost profĳits or economic harm. Under the U.S. Tarifff Act, a party subject to such a ban can appeal the decision to the President. The President is required to engage in a policy evaluation before approving the ban, rejecting it, or taking no action. On August 3, 2013, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, acting on behalf of President Obama's authority, notifĳied the ITC that the Administration had chosen to veto the importation ban. He wrote that this decision "does not mean that in this case [Samsung] is not entitled to a remedy. On the contrary, [ This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV continue to pursue its rights in the courts."80 He continued that the veto was based on "technical policy considerations" and their "efffect on competitive conditions in the U.S. economy and the efffect on U.S. consumers."81 After ruling against Apple on one set of Samsung patents, on August 9, 2013 the ITC ruled in favor of Apple on a set of Apple patents, holding that certain Samsung products violated several of Apple's patents. Here, the ITC held that these Samsung products should be banned from importation and sale within the United States.82 The U.S. administration did not act as kindly to Samsung as it did to Apple and the 60 day review period passed without a White House veto of the ban of Samsung products. In the meantime, Apple fĳiled an appeal to expand the ban to include newer Samsung products.
v Observations Despite the exceptional media profĳile of the Apple-Samsung case, the procedural path it has followed is typical for U.S. patent litigations and not signifĳicantly dissimilar of patent litigations in non-U.S. courts. Among the key characteristics of patent litigations worldwide are time, expense, substantive and procedural complexity at the pre-trial, trial and appellate levels. The U.S. process is further burdened by the cost and requirements of the discovery process and the uncertainties arising from the jury system. Non-U.S. courts, be they in common law, civil law or other jurisdictions, do not provide immunity from the time, expense and other detriments of litigation. All too often litigants in non-U.S. courts must labor through systems that require years for cases to proceed to trial o appeal or offfer judges with little if any knowledge of patent law or technology. In some instances, local court decisions are influenced by prejudice or bribery. The burden of conducting litigations in multiple national jurisdictions and the resulting likelihood of conflicting rulings are additional disadvantages. This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV
IV The Alternate Universe: Apple v. Samsung in International Arbitration
A Defĳining International Arbitration International arbitration is a globally recognized and utilized adjudicative process for resolving disputes. In international arbitration, the parties agree to submit a dispute that arises between them to arbitration as an alternative to a resolution by one or more national courts. International arbitration has been defĳined as "a specially established mechanism for the fĳinal and binding determination of disputes, concerning a contractual or other relationship with an international element, by independent arbitrators, in accordance with procedures, structures and substantive legal or non-legal standards chosen directly or indirectly by the parties."83 International arbitrations offfer each party a neutral forum outside of national court systems thereby "leveling the playing fĳield."84
Rather than being bound by the confĳines of national sovereignty, international arbitration is a global mechanism that relies on international treaty enforcement for recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. Awards rendered in international arbitration proceedings, unlike court judgments, are readily enforceable under treaty obligations. In the context of private party international commercial arbitrations, the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention") is the most notable treaty given its widespread adoption around the world. 85 For many years, international arbitration was largely the province of internationally fĳinanced infrastructure or energy projects, often involving one or more nation states as parties. Over the past decade, international arbitration has become a burgeoning method of dispute resolution for almost every aspect of international trade, commerce, and investment. This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV arbitration has traditionally been applied to commercial disputes, its use is increasing rapidly in the intellectual property arena.87
B
International Arbitration Principles
The growing global popularity of international arbitration to resolve a wide variety of business disputes, including intellectual property disputes, is due to several benefĳits of international arbitration over litigation. Commercial arbitration, and particularly international arbitration, is often guided by principles favoring a simpler, less expensive and a more expeditious form of dispute resolution than national courts.88 One of the key principles of international arbitration is party autonomy. In electing arbitration as the method of dispute resolution, parties have the power to choose the breadth of their arbitration clause, the forum of the arbitration, the governing law of the dispute, the rules that govern the arbitration process, the number of arbitrators, the arbitral tribunal and myriad processes with respect to disclosure and presentation of evidence. The overall process, from pleadings and disclosure of information to hearings, is less formal and rigid than litigation, and designed to be less timeconsuming, less expensive and more efffĳicient.89 Other signifĳicant attributes of international arbitration include country-neutral decision making, increased privacy for the litigants, resolution by experts in the technical fĳield, and global recognition of arbitration awards.
i
The Court's Inherent Power vs. The Parties' Choice to Arbitrate Courts are creatures of territorial defĳinition. A court's power extends no further than the reach of its jurisdiction and a court's jurisdiction is limited by national boundaries. Given territorial limitations, U.S. courts have no power over foreign patents, just as foreign courts have no power over U.S. patents.
For any court in the United States to adjudicate a case it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and the parties involved.90 U.S. federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases that address the validity and In the U.S. courts, personal jurisdiction involves the court's inherent authority over the party. A court does not have authority unless the party has certain minimum contacts with the forum state.92 A U.S. court's personal jurisdiction extends to parties which import or sell products in the forum state; however, the venue of the court and whether it is a convenient forum is an additional consideration. 93 Several obvious conclusions can be drawn with respect to the jurisdiction of courts. First, courts will have limited power over parties beyond their borders and in some cases will have no power over particular entities. Second, courts have limited power with respect to foreign laws, a particularly signifĳicant consideration in the context of patent disputes between multinational companies. Third, in the court system, potential defendants face considerable uncertainty in anticipating where they may be haled into court. Fourth, the territorial limitations of courts often necessitates multiple proceedings creating a risk of inconsistent and conflicting results.
In the international arbitration context, many of these pitfalls are avoided. The power of the arbitral tribunal to hear and adjudicate a case is clearly anticipated: the parties have consented to jurisdiction by written agreement either before or after a dispute has arisen.94 In a properly drafted international arbitration agreement, the parties will specify the seat of the arbitration, the applicable arbitral rules and the governing substantive law. The clause may also specify the arbitral institution, the number of arbitrators and the method of their selection (all often implied by the selection of the arbitral rules). In consenting to the seat of the arbitration, the parties submit to the power of the courts in that jurisdiction to compel and oversee arbitral proceedings. The selection is also enforceable by local law and international treaty protections. Consent is a fundamental prerequisite to arbitration and this is, admittedly, a considerable distinction between litigation and arbitration. Without the parties' written consent to arbitration at some point in the course of their dealings, international arbitration is not available as a means of dispute resolution.97 There are two basic ways parties can opt for arbitration: (1) by including a predispute arbitration clause in an agreement or (2) by submitting the dispute after it arises.98
Given the long history of Apple-Samsung dealings, a premise of this article is that, it would have been quite possible for them to have agreed to resolve the disputes in question by arbitration. Although it is not always the case in every patent dispute, there was ample opportunity for Apple and Samsung to consent to a broad arbitration provision in any one of the many supply or license agreements between them. In fact, it is counterintuitive why two large, sophisticated global business partners would not agree up front to a defĳined dispute resolution mechanism. A dispute resolution agreement would avoid uncertainties regarding where and how disputes are resolved. In a pre-dispute licensing scenario, an arbitration clause could be broader than the patent license itself. The clause could mandate that all future disputes between the parties, whether related to the respective patent or otherwise, will be submitted to arbitration in a mutually agreeable location, under mutually agreeable rules and governing law. If there is no pre-dispute agreement, the parties could collaboratively negotiate an arbitration agreement tailored to the specifĳic dispute at hand. 99
Not doing so could have been strategic but it is more likely that dispute resolution was an afterthought in business discussions; unfortunately the parties never pursued putting a global dispute resolution mechanism in place.
This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV simply included an appropriate arbitration clause in one of their contracts, they would have received many benefĳits unavailable to them in litigation.100
ii Forum In international arbitration, unlike litigation, the parties mutually select the forum. Parties in an international arbitration ordinarily specify an agreed seat of the arbitration in their arbitration agreement. Historically the selected seat was in a "neutral" third country but, more importantly, particularly in modern times, in a jurisdiction conducive to arbitration and convenient to the parties. Regardless of the chosen seat of arbitration, an international arbitration tribunal can conduct hearings in other jurisdictions.
Furthermore, unlike courts, the reach of arbitration panels is determined by the parties' agreement, not the judicial reach of the forum. Accordingly, arbitration panels are well-suited to address matters for the parties with a multinational focus.
These forum considerations have substantial import in the context of the Apple-Samsung litigations. The Apple and Samsung dispute is being litigated in the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Japan, Australia, England, and South Korea.101 If these litigations were consolidated into a single arbitration that addressed the dispute on a multinational level, there would be a substantial increase in efffĳiciency. The parties could have the disputes resolved in a single proceeding.102 The proceeding would be conducted in a mutually convenient location, with hearings in other locations, as needed, by a selected panel of arbitrators.
Undoubtedly a single arbitration proceeding would be less time-consuming, less costly and more efffĳicient for the parties than presenting their case in multiple courts around the world. Having a single proceeding limits the risk 100 All too often corporate law departments adopt a blanket position with respect to arbitration based on the predisposition of their General Counsel or a single negative experience in a particular matter. Taking the blanket position "we don't do arbitration" is a mistake. It denies the company the benefĳits of arbitration in cases where it would provide value. The blanket position may impose on the company expensive court litigations, an unenforceable court judgment or, worse, an adverse judgment from a hostile foreign court. iii Judicial and Arbitral Administration Court cases in diffferent countries are administered locally and independently. Each court relies on its own local procedures and practices. Each court schedules it cases independently. The process of administering the Apple-Samsung case in U.S. has little bearing on the court in Germany. Not only is there no coordination on judicial fĳindings, there is no administrative coordination among the courts.
In contrast, international arbitration offfers a single proceeding typically administered for the parties by an arbitral institution.103 The selected arbitral institution oversees and administers the entire process from initiation of the proceeding, to assisting the parties in selecting the arbitration panel, to scheduling and ensuring the award is timely delivered to the parties.104 Some arbitral institutions, most notably the ICC Court of Arbitration, have detailed processes to scrutinize draft awards (albeit at a higher cost for institutional services). The quality of arbitral institutions and their rule provisions can vary widely, particularly from country to country. Crucially, in all arbitration matters, the selected arbitral institution works at the behest of the parties rather than the parties being dependent on court clerks for administrative and scheduling support.
If Apple and Samsung had opted to arbitrate they would not be addressing fĳifty separate lawsuits in ten diffferent jurisdictions. Rather than being dependent on the vagaries of diffferent national courts, the disputes would be addressed in a single proceeding administered for them by a private arbitral institution. This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV iv Decision-Makers: Judges, Juries and Arbitrators The judges of many courts have no intellectual property or technical experience. In the U.S., federal trial court judges are allotted patent disputes on their dockets, along with a variety of other civil and criminal matters. They may or may not have prior experience dealing with technology or complex patent issues before deciding a case. One U.S. study has concluded that, "judges with very little patent experience manage the vast majority of cases."105 Judicial inexperience with patent law and technology issues is not limited to the U.S. courts; most other non-U.S. jurisdictions similarly do not have specialized patent trial courts.
The prevalence of juries in U.S. patent trials is another complicating factor. A party to a U.S. patent infringement suit has a constitutional right to request a jury trial.106 There are no distinct prerequisites in serving as a jury member for a patent trial. In the U.S., in stark contrast to the rest of the world,107 jury trials are customary in patent infringement cases, with jury members deciding the vast majority of issues.108 The likelihood of technical error and unfounded decision-making is obvious. All too often jury trials are likely decided on gut feelings rather than principled application of the law to the facts.
In the international arbitration setting, the parties select the decision-makers. There are a variety of mechanisms used to select the arbitration panel. Typically three neutral arbitrators are appointed, with each party selecting one arbitrator and the parties or party-appointed arbitrators jointly selecting the third arbitrator. Alternatively, the arbitrator(s) could be designated in the arbitration clause or appointed from a list provided by the arbitral institution. In This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV smaller cases, a single arbitrator is typically appointed either jointly by the parties or by the arbitral institution. The rules of the leading arbitral institutions and the laws of many jurisdictions impose strict requirements for arbitrator neutrality and conflict disclosure, typically much more stringent than required of judges in many countries. Thus, a chief advantage of international arbitration over court proceedings is the ability of the parties to select expert decision makers of their choosing. The parties are free to specify arbitrator qualifĳications in their arbitration agreement or simply appoint a panel that satisfĳies their requirements. Undoubtedly, a panel of skilled arbitrators, whether engineers, industry insiders or technology lawyers, are better qualifĳied to address patent disputes than most jurors and many judges. The ability of parties to choose expert arbitrators would minimize the risk of an erroneous ruling by an unqualifĳied judge or runaway jury and allow the parties more control in the process of resolving their dispute.
The U.S. Apple v. Samsung litigation was fĳiled in a court with robust experience with patent disputes. The jurisdiction of the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California includes Silicon Valley where many of the world's most innovative technology companies, including Apple, maintain their corporate headquarters.109 However, as noted above, reportedly only one jury member had direct experience with patents. While it is unknown what role the jurors' background and lack of experience played in their reaching the verdict, one may reasonably argue that few jurors are qualifĳied to render a reasoned judgment in such a complex technical legal dispute.
If Apple and Samsung had agreed to international arbitration, the parties could have selected a panel of patent and technology law experts of their choosing and engaged in a much more efffĳicient, focused proceeding. Arguably, a panel of three qualifĳied arbitrators can collectively reach a reasoned decision on a patent matter as well as, if not better than, a single judge and almost certainly better than a jury lacking any legal or technical background.
At a minimum, the popularity of Apple as a cultural icon in the U.S. and the predilection of juries to decide against foreign parties should have made international arbitration particularly attractive to Samsung. This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV v Privacy and Confĳidentiality Privacy and confĳidentiality can be important considerations in analyzing the benefĳits of the international arbitral process over litigation. Court proceedings in many countries are open to the public. In the U.S., patent litigations are ordinarily public proceedings. Pleadings, motion papers and other key fĳilings are routinely available to the public and increasingly available online. In the U.S., although much of the evidence exchanged in the discovery process is not fĳiled with the court, key documents are often disclosed in the course of motion practice and the trial. The exception is where the court enters protective orders at the request of a party to protect confĳidential information such as proprietary technical information or fĳinancial data. In such instances, the court will require parties to maintain confĳidentiality of information exchanges and allow sealed fĳilings; the court may also conduct closed court sessions when proprietary information is being discussed.
Likewise, in U.S. courts, there is typically no requirement on the parties to refrain from discussing the case publicly, except to the extent the court enters a protective order protecting the opposing party's proprietary information.110 As a result, the parties in major cases often present their cases to the media as well as the court.
In stark contrast, international arbitration proceedings are private. The proceedings are not open to the public. The law in most jurisdictions provides that international arbitral proceedings are also confĳidential and the rules of the leading arbitral institutions fĳill any gap requiring that the tribunal and the parties keep all matters relating to the arbitration and award confĳidential unless the parties consent otherwise.111 Thus the proceedings and the documents submitted during arbitration remain inaccessible to third parties. The only time the existence of an arbitration may be acknowledged is if a party fĳiles in court to seek assistance with the proceeding or the enforcement of the arbitration award.
As a practical matter, the use of protective orders in both litigation and arbitration to prevent disclosure of proprietary information makes the distinction between confĳidentiality in court proceedings and arbitration proceedings somewhat moot. In both forums, proprietary information is protected from disclosure to the public and provided on a restricted basis to the other party. (In litigation, the broad scope of the U.S. discovery process does provide This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV a somewhat greater risk (or benefĳit, depending on one's point of view) that proprietary information will be made accessible to the opposing party.) Thus, the more signifĳicant distinction between court proceedings and arbitration centers around public access to the proceedings. In major cases, the distinction translates into whether there will be media coverage of the proceeding.
The privacy and increased confĳidentiality from the public offfered in international arbitration may be a key element for a party in deciding whether to arbitrate.112 Conversely the decision to try a case in court, and have greater public scrutiny, could be a strategic consideration as well. Certainly there are policy considerations to be taken into account in considering whether major commercial disputes are best resolved in public view or in private hearing rooms.
In the context of the Apple-Samsung dispute, as with any major technology matter, in both litigation or international arbitration the parties relied on court-approved protective orders to guard against the disclosure of proprietary information.113 As to non-proprietary information, Apple and Samsung have both relied upon the media to help tell their stories to the public. As would be expected, media briefĳings and resulting news articles, are more talking points than expositions of the detailed legal issues being decided in the courts.
Unless the parties agreed otherwise, media access to the international arbitration process and information disclosed in the course of the proceeding would be strictly limited, although certain minimal disclosures would likely be required in the course of public securities fĳilings. Whether Apple or Samsung would prefer confĳidentiality over media scrutiny depends on their success in litigating the cases and their broader marketing strategy. What is certain is that the litigation process mandates exposure to media scrutiny while international arbitration would provide the parties a choice in the matter.
vi
Preliminary Injunctive Relief Every nation sets its own standards for protective provisions in advance of trial. In the U.S., a preliminary injunction is considered an "extraordinary remedy 112 Parties must analyze the capacity for confĳidentiality or lack thereof to afffect the sales and reputation of the brand. Trial proceedings undoubtedly impact the public market place and whether that could be benefĳicial or detrimental depends on winning or losing the case. This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV never awarded as of right."114 In each case, courts must balance the competing claims of injury and consider the efffect of granting or refusing the requested relief, paying particular regard to the public consequences.115 In patent cases, as long as a patentee can establish the requisite factors to a "near certainty,"116 a court will grant the preliminary injunction and thereby bar the defendant from making, distributing, and selling the infringing products. Under the leading international arbitral rules, international arbitrators have broad discretion in issuing directives for interim relief and making initial awards before rendering a fĳinal decision.117 Regardless of whether the parties are in court or arbitration, the same substantive law considerations should apply.
Procedurally, a preliminary injunction granted by an international arbitration tribunal can give rise to certain enforcement concerns. A party can turn to a local court to grant a preliminary injunction or enforce a preliminary injunction ordered by the tribunal. The enforceability of a tribunal's order for interim relief may not be as readily enforced by a foreign court on the basis that it is not a fĳinal award as mandated by treaty requirements. Although preliminary injunctions issued by arbitral tribunals are not "fĳinal" awards under the provisions of the FAA and the New York Convention, U.S. courts will likely enforce an arbitrator's award of preliminary injunctive relief where such an injunction makes the ultimate award by the arbitral panel "meaningful. "118 This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV As a practical matter, when an arbitral tribunal grants interim relief, it is in the best interests of the parties to comply. Otherwise, the non-complying party risks the arbitrator viewing the non-compliance adversely in considering the case on the merits and in making the fĳinal award.
In the context of preliminary injunctions in the Apple-Samsung litigations, multiple courts were asked to make preliminary injunction rulings under multiple bodies of law based on overlapping factual issues. That scenario almost ensures inconsistencies. Where the German and Dutch courts granted a preliminary injunction on the sale of Samsung's Galaxy Tab 10.1, the England, South Korean and Japanese courts denied it. Even if the requirements for preliminary injunctions were the same in every jurisdiction, the factual case-bycase analysis of the judge remains largely subjective.119
If the Apple-Samsung dispute had been submitted to international arbitration, there would have been more consistency and certainty in the preliminary injunction stage. A single arbitral panel could have assessed the necessity of a worldwide preliminary injunction. The decision would have avoided the divergent results that Apple and Samsung confronted: preliminary injunctions granted in some places and not others. A consistent substantive analysis would have been applied and there would be little doubt over whether the enjoined party would comply. Furthermore, reliance on an arbitral tribunal to issue a preliminary injunction would have avoided the flip-flopping trial and appellate court decisions in the U.S. court case.
vii
Discovery vs. Disclosure The approach to exchange of information constitutes a crucial distinction between litigation and international arbitration. International arbitration favors a minimal "disclosure" of information whereas litigation, depending on where it is conducted, involves a broader pre-trial production of all evidence.
Common law and civil law courts have divergent approaches to gathering relevant evidence and information. Common law proceedings are adversarial in nature and the lawyers take the lead in gathering evidence and examining the witnesses. Civil law proceedings employ an inquisitorial approach where the judge has the leading role in gathering evidence and conducting This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV examinations. As a result, information disclosure tends to be more limited and focused in civil law proceedings. Thus, even in the context of litigation, there is wide variation on information exchange practices. These inconsistencies have been debated and accommodated in the international arbitration arena.120
The U.S. represents the extreme in approaches to pre-trial production of evidence. In the U.S. litigation discovery process, the parties may submit extensive pre-trial requests for documents and other information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. Under U.S. federal and state procedures, the requests can require responses to written interrogatory questions, extensive paper and electronic document production, party and third-party witness deposition testimony and inspections.
The U.S. discovery process can become sprawling, costly, and hugely timeconsuming.121 The average length of the discovery process for a patent case, including discovery requests, depositions, interrogatories and clarifying motions, is three years.122 As a result, many large-scale patent disputes take a decade on average to resolve.123 For a patent dispute, document discovery could require extensive searches of archived hard copy and electronic data and could easily involve production of hundreds of thousands of documents. The deposition process is equally time-consuming and intrusive, particularly for witnesses from countries where adversarial examination by lawyers is an unfamiliar concept. Penalties are signifĳicant; failing to provide the requesting party with required discovery can result in monetary sanctions or dismissal. 124 Disclosure in international arbitral proceedings is far less burdensome. Traditionally, parties in international arbitration disclose only those documents on which they intend to rely, rather than all relevant documents.125
This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Depositions and interrogatories are inconsistent with the standard international arbitration process. This limited disclosure philosophy puts the focus on the central documents supporting each party's case. This approach increases efffĳiciency and reduces the overall cost and duration of the process by avoiding the production of vast quantities of useless documents and other information.
For some practitioners, particularly those from common law jurisdictions, this limited disclosure is a shocking concept. The debate has resulted in various accommodations in international arbitration practice. This result is best represented by the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, which practitioners describe as a "successful compromise" of both civil law and common law approaches to disclosure.126 While the Commentary to the Rules indicates that "expansive American-or English-style discovery is generally inappropriate in international arbitration,"127 the Rules allow for document requests that are "carefully tailored to issues that are relevant and material to the determination of the case."128
In considering arbitral procedure as applied to the Apple-Samsung case, it is clear that the discovery process would have been streamlined based on the principle of limited disclosure. There would have been fewer disclosure requests, fewer motions to compel production, and few if any depositions or interrogatories.
The extended disclosure provided by the IBA Rules is still too restrictive to many U.S. practitioners. Undoubtedly there is a trade-offf between broad discovery in litigation and the efffĳiciencies of limited disclosure in arbitration. In the end, what really matters is whether there is a diffference in the substantive outcome in the case and we explore that question below.
It is unlikely that limited disclosure would alter the substantive outcome of most patent disputes. The Apple-Samsung case supports the proposition. The majority of evidence relied on at trial in Apple-Samsung case consisted of physical displays of the challenged products, records from the patent prosecution fĳiles and expert testimony relating to the software these products employed. In other words, Apple prevailed largely by relying on its own documents and public records rather than discovery. Arguably, the same evidence would have been relied upon and the same result would have resulted if the Apple-Samsung case had been submitted to international arbitration. Millions of dollars in discovery practice could have been avoided. This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV viii Experts Expert testimony is critical in both the litigation and international arbitration of patent disputes. In litigation, the parties spend considerable amounts of time and money in qualifying and educating experts and having them prepare their testimony for written reports, depositions and trial. Expert presentations to juries are often colorful. While courts regard experts as important in providing damage calculations, they have warned against using experts as "hired guns"129 for presenting an "impenetrable facade of mathematics" to a jury. 130 In international arbitration, the parties either appoint their own experts or the tribunal may appoint an independent expert. Where the parties appoint their own experts, the chief diffference between litigation and arbitration is the audience to which the experts present their testimony. Where there is a single panel-appointed expert, a battle of the experts is replaced with a theoretically more objective presentation. In both situations, the expert presentation is made to an arbitral panel that presumably has more skill in the subject matter than a typical Judge or jury.
Accordingly, had Apple and Samsung agreed to international arbitration, the processes regarding expert witness testimony would have been simplifĳied and likely less costly. Having the experts present to a skilled panel rather than a jury would have led to changes in the demeanor of the experts' pre sentations. Reliance on a single expert would have certainly altered the presentations. Although it is unclear whether these changes would have led to a diffferent outcome in the case, it is fairly certain that the experts would have presented in a more direct and sophisticated manner and their opinions would have been subjected to more qualifĳied scrutiny.
ix Settlement Incentives The common saying that most cases settle "on the courthouse steps" applies equally to arbitration.131 Settlement avoids the risk of loss and the possibility of negative publicity. It also afffords the parties an opportunity for a businessfocused resolution. The incentive to settle an international arbitration may be heightened because the parties cannot appeal to a higher court. International arbitration provides a somewhat less contentious milieu than litigation, thereby creating a more welcoming environment for such settlement discussions. This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Many technology disputes are resolved through cross-licensing agreements or other business-based settlements. In the context of the Apple-Samsung case, the parties have ongoing business ties. The substantial jury verdict against Samsung changes the settlement dynamic. Settlement may be particularly warranted here because, as the case history suggests, there are serious questions regarding the strength of each party's case. As settlement discussions are confĳidential, all that is clear is that the parties have not settled yet.
It is difffĳicult to say whether international arbitration would have produced an early settlement; it is safe to say the opportunity for a business-focused settlement would be as good if not better had the parties elected international arbitration.
x
Hearing Procedure The hearings in international arbitration and litigation difffer in terms of formality and process details. In litigation, procedural and evidentiary rules strictly govern the trial. The international arbitration hearing is conducted in a less formal and ideally more expedient manner but with the similar goal of a fair hearing on the merits. In international arbitration, the principal of party autonomy permits the parties to jointly develop a hearing process that suits the case.
The procedural stages for both arbitration and litigation hearings are similar. Both employ opening statements, witness testimony and closing statements.132 One notable diffference is that in international arbitration, direct testimony traditionally comes in the form of written afffĳidavits. Doing so makes the introduction of direct testimony more efffĳicient and allows counsel and the tribunal to focus on areas in need of clarifĳication.
In the Apple-Samsung litigation, it took several days to select the jury and three weeks to conclude the trial.133 That is a relatively short period of time for a major U.S. litigation. Presumably even less time would be required to hear the case as an international arbitration, principally through the elimination of This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV jury selection and the expedited admission of evidence. The hearing process would difffer from a trial, but those diffferences would be unlikely to lead to a substantively diffferent outcome.
xi Deliberations The deliberative process in a trial varies signifĳicantly depending on whether the matter is a bench or jury trial. In a U.S. jury trial in a patent case, the jury is sequestered and must reach a unanimous decision based on the court's legal instructions.134 Given the number of jurors, their lack of background knowledge in the subject matter of the case and the many diffferent variables they encounter, a unanimous and reasoned judgment is difffĳicult to achieve.135
In contrast, in a bench trial, there is only one decision-maker and much less risk of uncertainty. The deliberative process undertaken by a single arbitrator should parallel the process undertaken by a judge in a bench trial. A three-arbitrator tribunal provides the added opportunity of deliberation by three experts in the fĳield.
While a particular judge may be well qualifĳied to decide a patent matter, there is no assurance of a bench trial in U.S. patent litigation. Electing international arbitration provides the opportunity that the decision will be rendered by an expert or panel of experts rather than a jury.
xii
Substantive Considerations Patent law remains constant regardless of whether it is the subject of a court or international arbitration proceeding. The focus in contrasting international arbitration and litigation then is whether the substance of the outcome would vary with difffering procedures. The most signifĳicant procedural diffference we have identifĳied is the limited exchange of information in advance of the hearing. We consider whether this and other procedural diffferences would alter the substantive analysis of the case. To consider this alternative scenario, one must examine how proving patent validity, infringement, and damages would difffer in international arbitral practice.
1
Patent Validity Under U.S. patent law, for a patent to be valid, it must satisfy the elements of patentable subject matter, novelty, utility, non-obviousness, and enablement.136 Discovery is not needed to establish non-obviousness based on prior art. In the U.S. and many other jurisdictions, the patent prosecution record is publicly available. The parties are able to review the USPTO patent history and conduct their own research on prior art references without needing to engage the opposing party in discovery of this information.
In some U.S. cases, the date of invention could also serve as a means for challenging a patent's validity. At the time the Apple-Samsung case was fĳiled, the U.S. awarded patents on a fĳirst to invent rule even if the application was fĳiled later in time than a competing application. Thus the parties found it necessary to request discovery supporting how and when the inventors developed these technologies.138 In March 2013, the U.S. shifted to a fĳirst-to-fĳile system. This makes discovery of documents supporting the date of invention of limited value.
As demonstrated above, broad discovery is of little utility to address validity under the patent laws. In an international arbitration, the parties would presumably rely on their own disclosures to support the validity or invalidity of patents. Both sides would have access to all the documents that the opposing party intended to assert to support its claims. To the extent there are documents that are relevant and material to deciding whether the challenged patent is valid, modern international arbitration procedure allows the party to request such documentation. Accordingly, international arbitration would not have efffected a diffferent substantive outcome in determining patent validity in the Apple-Samsung case.
2 Infringement Likewise, international arbitration would not have efffected a diffferent substantive outcome in determining infringement.
In a U.S. patent infringement suit, the judge, not the jury, interprets the meaning of the claims in the patent.139 This process, referred to as a "Markman hearing", which typically occurs well in advance of trial, has become an important feature of U.S. patent litigations because it can have a major afffect on the This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV outcome of the case.140 At the trial, the judge instructs the jury as to the meaning of the claims, leaving the jury to decide whether or not the accused products infringe.141
The principal infringement issue in the Apple-Samsung case was whether Samsung's products infringed Apple's iPad and iPhone patents. The assessment of infringement of the iPad design patents focused on Samsung products themselves. Judge Koh instructed the jury that the test for infringement of design patents is whether the overall appearances of the accused design and the claimed design are substantially the same.142 She instructed the jury to compare Samsung's accused products with Apple's design patents.143
Similarly, the assessment on infringement of the Apple utility patents was focused on elements of Samsung products and a determination as to whether they were covered by the patent claims. Judge Koh provided her interpretation of the Apple's utility claims at issue and defĳined ways in which the jury could determine infringement (either directly, literally, or under the doctrine of equivalents).144 Each of these approaches required comparing the patent claims with the challenged product. In the Apple-Samsung case, this evidence was readily available through examination of the Samsung products and accompanying documentation.145
In the alternative universe of an international arbitration, the AppleSamsung tribunal would base its decision on infringement on the same readily available evidence. Consequently, there would not likely be substantive variation in the fĳindings on infringement. This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV market share.146 To determine lost profĳits the patentee must prove (1) demand for the patented product, (2) an absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes, (3) the patentee's manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand and (4) the amount of the profĳit the patentee would have made.147 A patentee may also present evidence to suggest a reasonable royalty based on the infringer's sales. This involves demonstrating the amount that a person, desiring to manufacture and sell a patented article, would be willing to pay as a royalty in selling the patented article in the market at a reasonable profĳit. There are a host of factors that a patentee may present to support the assertion of a reasonable royalty.148
Under the market share rule the court is asked to assume that the patentee's market share, relative to the non-infringer, would have remained the same in the absence of the infringers. It is assumed that the patentee would have made the same percentage of the infringer's sales as the patentee made in the overall market. 149 Discovery can be useful in proving compensatory damages. A plaintifff may rely on records of sales, profĳit margins, distributors, and other internal records This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV to substantiate claims of lost profĳits and lost market share. The plaintifff may also use this discovery to suggest an alternative reasonable royalty.
In the Apple-Samsung litigation, both parties sought sales-related data during the discovery phase. This volume of information exchange would not be available in international arbitration unless specifĳically provided by the parties. On the other hand, disclosure of internal sales and profĳit data can still be accomplished in a summary fashion in arbitration. Relying on disclosure of specifĳic information could well be a more efffective way to proceed. In the Apple-Samsung case, the judge overturned the jury's fĳinding of willful infringement, reasoning that although Apple presented evidence of copying, this did not prove knowing infringement.155 In fact, the evidence showed that Samsung believed that Apple's patents were limited in scope. The Court deemed Samsung's assessment as "reasonable" and therefore not supporting of willful infringement. This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV In the context of an international arbitration, one would expect that a defendant such as Samsung would disclose available evidence supporting the conclusion that it did not willfully infringe. It would be reasonable to expect that Apple would have been allowed to request information to test this defense. The absence of broad information exchange in international arbitration would tend to limit willful infringement awards. As demonstrated in the Apple-Samsung case, Samsung was able to defend against such damages despite Apple having broad discovery. There is no basis to conclude the fĳinding would be any diffferent in an international arbitration.
xiii Appellate Review and Award Confĳirmation Nearly all countries provide rights of appeal against judgments in patent litigations, in some cases to specialized courts and in others to appellate courts with general jurisdiction. 156 The purpose of an appeal is, generally, to review for errors of law and determine whether such errors are material. In the U.S., claim construction is reviewed de novo.157 This is a central basis for reversing fĳindings of infringement or non-infringement. Arguably, the steady increase of patent infringement appeals in the U.S. over the past ten years158 is due to promising rates of reversal. 159 The high reversal rate suggests that errors routinely occur at the trial court level. While appellate review is benefĳicial to correct those errors, the litigation process would be more efffĳicient if errors did not occur in the fĳirst place. Despite its value in correcting court judgments, appellate review adds time, cost and uncertainty to the litigation process.
There is generally no appeal from the award of an arbitration tribunal. One might argue an arbitral tribunal is best situated to reach a correct decision in the fĳirst place, thereby avoiding the necessity for appeal. Arbitral tribunals in patent cases normally have the advantage of being composed of experts in the fĳield. As well, the collaborative nature of the arbitration deliberations efffectively provides a "built in" error-checking mechanism. For some parties these safeguards are not enough; they have the opportunity to put in place This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV procedures for arbitration awards to be reviewed by appellate arbitration panels just as appellate courts would review judgments. 160 After the arbitrator renders an award, it is binding on the parties. There is typically no requirement to seek local court confĳirmation, although many jurisdictions provide confĳirmation procedures to have awards enforced locally as judgments. 161 In jurisdictions favoring arbitration, the bases for confĳirma-tion typically parallel bases for treaty enforcement and provide limited opportunity for review.
Over the course of the Apple-Samsung litigation, the parties have appealed several preliminary rulings from the District Court to the Federal Circuit. At the time of this writing there are pending appeals for the denial of Apple's motion for a permanent injunction162 and rulings on the sealing of documents. 163 The Federal Circuit court has denied Apple's request to expedite its injunction appeal. 164 Samsung fĳiled an appeal post-trial rulings upholding the jury verdict and both parties are expected to fĳile appeals on infringement and damages upon entry of judgment after the new trial on certain damage claims. 165 Despite a costly litigation including a trial on the merits,166 the AppleSamsung litigation is yet to be concluded. As with any U.S. patent litigation, This is a digital offfprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV there is a good possibility of reversal on appeal to be followed by additional years of trial court proceedings and appellate review. Had Apple and Samsung elected international arbitration, the matter would be resolved. The advantage of international arbitration in providing a speedy and fĳinal resolution is readily apparent.
xiv
Award Recognition The advantage of international arbitration does not stop there. International arbitration awards are widely recognized and enforceable around the world. The New York Convention allows for international recognition and enforcement of international arbitration awards made in member states, the total of which reached 148 in 2013.167 The New York Convention provides narrow exceptions.168
In contrast, there is yet to be a widely adopted multi-national treaty for the enforcement of court judgments.169 Accordingly, the only way to enforce a foreign court judgment is to rely on local laws (or bilateral treaty arrangements).
ARSTECHNICA, July 23, 2012, available at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/ apple-v-samsung-whose-lawyers-are-getting-paid-in-the-smartphone-wars/. 167 For a list of current member countries see http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ new-york-convention-countries/contracting-states. 168 A court may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign award only if (1) the arbitration agreement was invalid; there was a lack of proper notice or party was otherwise unable to present his case; (3) the award is wholly beyond the terms and scope of the parties' submission to arbitration; (4) the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or (5) the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country where that award was made. Additionally recognition and enforcement may be refused where the subject matter is viewed as inarbitrable under the laws of the confĳirming country or the public policy of that country would be violated as a result. New York Convention, supra note 79, Art. 5. In most states, foreign court judgments are not recognized or enforceable. At best, these judgments would have res judicata efffect or serve as persuasive authority in a new proceeding. In the context of the Apple-Samsung case, international arbitration would provide important treaty enforcement benefĳits. The United States and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) are signatories to the New York Convention. They are not signatories to a bilateral treaty to enforce court judgments. Thus, while a U.S. international arbitration award would be enforceable against Samsung in South Korea, a U.S. court judgment would not be. Perhaps more importantly, the opportunity for multinational enforcement of an arbitration award would allow the parties to seek enforcement in other states where the parties are doing business or otherwise have assets. A U.S. court judgment would not provide any of these benefĳits.
V Conclusion
The public policy rationale behind the patent law is to motivate and encourage innovation yet Apple and Google now spend more on patent litigation and licensing than on product research and development. The ongoing AppleSamsung litigations have provided Apple an uncertain and possibly short-term victory in the U.S. As the litigations lumber onward, both Apple and Samsung are diverting resources that, instead, could be invested in innovation. Some commentators liken the current culture of patent litigation to Cold War era international policy; in using patents as weapons, the world's major technology companies are in an arms race to mutually-assured destruction.170 Apple should take particular heed. Just as the U.S. and the Soviet Union lined up proxy-states, Apple faces challenges from a long line of Android manufacturers beyond Samsung. It is possible there will be even larger Android wars between Apple, Google and Microsoft. As in the Cold War scenario, the costs make it questionable whether there will be any true winner.
This turns us to the question of the alternate universe of international arbitration. As demonstrated, had Apple and Samsung simply agreed at some point in the long course of their business history to submit disputes to international arbitration, they would be living in a very diffferent, more attractive including "new jurisdictional fĳilters." This project is in the "preliminary" stages. More than that, the process would have been efffĳicient and efffective, likely yielding a better reasoned decision than will eventually be obtained from years of courtroom battles. For that matter, international arbitration would likely have provided a more coherent, globally comprehensive result than will be provided by a gaggle of jurors and judges around the world. Instead of disparate, potentially inconsistent local court judgments, international arbitration would have provided a reasoned award that would be enforceable worldwide in a single sweep.
In the end, the Apple-Samsung litigations, like many battles between technology giants, may be settled. Apple and Samsung remain intertwined in business relationships as they awkwardly battle each other in court. By its nature, a private arbitral proceeding is a more comfortable path to a business settlement. The parties may well have been building new business relationships with each other by now had they relied on an international arbitration clause.
For Apple, Samsung and the combatants in future Android wars, litigation may be a traditional legal and business strategy. Perhaps the goal is not innovation and the efffĳicient adjudication of patent rights but to overcome the opponent by exhausting its resources. Most companies and certainly consumers and investors want better. A better strategy is one which produces a reasoned, comprehensive decision with time and cost savings. International arbitration meets the requirement. In so doing, it provides a means to get technology companies out of the litigation war zone and back to the business of technology innovation. 
